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Just over fifty years after its precarious launch as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade
Organization (WTO) has grown into the most potent symbol of globalization. The raucous events at the launch of the Millennium
Round of Trade Negotiations in Seattle confirmed this perception. But few activists on any side of the trade issue in Seattle
recognized the historical irony inherent in the WTO's current status: while today it is a symbol of integration and free trade, it
began as an apparent failure of international cooperation. 
Planned while bitter fighting still raged around the world, the International Trade Organization (ITO) was intended to form the
third leg of the post-war international economic arrangements, along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank). Largely because of political division within the United
States that resulted from the compromises embedded in the institution and its Charter, the ITO was never established.(1) The
free trade agenda was forced to balance on a thin branch - the provisional GATT. 
The GATT was signed in 1947 as an interim, voluntary agreement. Its signatories intended the ITO to subsume and finalize the
GATT in the ITO negotiations scheduled for Havana in 1948. When it became apparent that it had failed, the ITO's architects
cast a despondent glance toward the GATT. With no formal institutional structure and very little publicity, the GATT persisted
in making a revolutionary demand upon the nation-state - it must perpetually relinquish its sovereign right to raise tariff rates.
The endurance of an international regime on such a basis, for so long, is without precedent. Why have members of the GATT /
WTO system continued to cooperate? Is there anything in the substance and form of this institution itself that has enabled it
to endure and strengthen over time, while other multilateral regimes have crumbled or weakened?
A central part of this paper is to first, uncover the negotiating history of the GATT by investigating hitherto unexamined
archival material, and reconsider the historical and political context that gave rise to the Agreement. Second, it seeks to distill
the important features of the re-invigorated GATT / WTO that were both present at its origins and have contributed to its
durability.
The First Postwar Negotiation
Bouncing in a rickety military C-47 "with bucketseats like barrels", Will Clayton and Emilio Collado flew out of Potsdam on a
Sunday in late August, 1947. After an exhausting trip, they finally arrived in London. Clayton, the American Under Secretary of
State for Foreign Economic Policy, and Collado, his advisor, prepared to meet on Monday with British officials Hugh Dalton,
Stafford Cripps and John Maynard Keynes - respectively the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the President of the Board of Trade,
and a prominent economist working in the Treasury Department. Monday, however, was "one of those so-called bank holidays",
and unfortunately "no one but Keynes was willing to meet [them] to discuss the rehabilitation of the nation on a bank
holiday!"(2) 
The Japanese had just surrendered and, though still elated, Clayton and Collado "were horrified to hear of the action taken over
the weekend in Washington to cut off Lend-Lease." Truman had indeed terminated Lend-Lease abruptly on August 21, 1945.
Clayton immediately phoned Secretary of State Jimmy Byrnes in Washington, DC. Although he was famous for his even temper
and uncommon self-control, Clayton was furious with Byrnes. The British were also shocked and angry. Hugh Dalton soon
arrived with Lord Brand from the British Treasury. Dalton exclaimed: "What's the use of sitting here talking to you about what
will happen when suddenly we learn from Washington what you're really doing!" Fortunately, Clayton and Brand knew each other
from when Brand served as British Treasury Representative in Washington. "The British were terribly upset, and this showed
how close [Clayton] was to Brand, for together they bound up the hurts."(3)
Two high-ranking, economic civil servants mobilized their friendship to mend diplomatic fences at a tense moment. Like millions
of others, from Roosevelt and Churchill through to American soldiers and British civilians, they forged a tight bond during war.Elite policymakers from both nations, many of whom had recently emigrated from business and academia to join the
government, found themselves working particularly closely with their counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic.
Both Clayton and Brand had been involved in postwar planning for several years. Clayton had played an important role in an
official planning process that American Secretary of State Cordell Hull first formally launched shortly after war broke out in
September of 1939.(4) Soon 'postwar planning' came to occupy a significant minority of the State Department's human
resources. The Cabinet, the Treasury and Commerce Departments, and various other public and private institutions also
eventually became involved. 
A comparable effort in Britain did not materialize until several years later. While the Americans worked assiduously and
deliberately to map out their ideal postwar order, the British concentrated on survival. Nonetheless, the two countries'
interests in the postwar system first came into conflict in August of 1941when Churchill and Roosevelt met to devise the
Atlantic Charter. The Placentia Bay meeting became the first of many such Anglo-American encounters, where officials
deliberated postwar policy commitments. For precisely four years following the August 14 signing of the Atlantic Charter, the
British and the Americans made various official promises to one another about postwar trade policy,(5) through several
'informal' discussions and seminars. 
Then the sudden surrender of the Japanese on August 14, 1945 shocked even leading planners like Will Clayton. The planning
was over; the postwar world had arrived. With the cancellation of Lend-Lease, Britain found itself in dire financial straits. It had
an export industry crippled by war and by the limitations imposed under the Lend-Lease agreement, a deficit of five billion
dollars on its international account, and pressure on sterling stemming from cumbersome debts to members of the Sterling
Bloc. Britain looked urgently to the US for a loan. With the World Bank and IMF already successfully negotiated, both countries
also sensed a critical need to lead the world toward the re-establishment of normal trading relations. They aimed to institute
the planned ITO.
Thus Clayton, Cripps and other officials in London hurriedly prepared to launch formal talks on both financial aid to Britain and
the structure of the postwar trading system. They scheduled a start date one month later in Washington, DC. Finally, after
more than six years of planning on the American side and four years of bilateral deliberation, the first formal, postwar
negotiations to establish an international commercial policy regime finally commenced on October 1, 1945. 
British Resistance
For two months in Washington, officials from the British Treasury, Board of Trade and Foreign Office, led by Sir Percivale
Liesching and Lord Keynes, negotiated the commercial policy provisions with officials from the American Departments of State
and Treasury. Will Clayton and Harry Hawkins, Chief of the Commercial Policy Division and Agreements, led the State
Department contingent. Fred Vinson, Secretary of the Treasury, and Harry Dexter White, who had played such a significant role
at the Bretton Woods negotiations, concentrated more on the loan negotiations as leading Treasury representatives. 
In August of 1945, the American economy was providing more than half of the world's entire output. Arguably, the United
States had attained the highest relative level of military, political and economic power it had ever possessed, or ever would
again. Britain's economy was in crisis. Keynes circulated a memo on August 13 in which he listed the three main sources of
financial assistance upon which the British had depended in order to wage war. Lend-Lease from the United Sates, Mutual Aid
from Canada, and credits from the Sterling Area countries had enabled Britain to fight without having to increase exports to
pay for food and raw materials needed at home, or to furnish the cash they spent abroad.(6) Thus, as the war suddenly
finished, the new Labor Government faced a "predicament unique in British peacetime history": national bankruptcy, "yet
imperial world commitments at their grandest and most costly ever."(7) In addition, they faced American negotiators who
seemed intent to exploit the British need for financial aid in order to gain adherence to State Department plans for the postwar
trading regime.(8) As Prime Minister Clement Attlee succinctly described the situation: "We weren't in a position to bargain."(9)
They bargained, however, very successfully. They went to Washington to negotiate the recently completed 'Draft Proposal to
Establish an International Trade Organization', composed by the Americans, based upon the wartime discussions. The British
left Washington having transformed the 'Washington Proposals ' so significantly that each major issue came to represent their
interest in a more protectionist trade organization. The Americans surrendered vital concessions on every major trading issue
of the time, from the elimination of Imperial preferences, to quotas, cartels, state trading, subsidies, and export taxes. 
Publicity surrounding the loan negotiations, which took place simultaneously, proved so intense that contemporary
commentators almost completely overlooked the American concessions on commercial policy. Historians have followed suit,
generally failing to recognize or examine the baffling tension between British economic and political strength, and their
achievements in these negotiations. While all negotiations require compromise to be successful, there is not always equal
compromise. Nor is there always equal commitment to success. In this negotiation, the country that needed success the most
also had less to compromise, and less to offer in return for concessions from the other side. Yet its position won the day.
How? And what was the significance of this peculiar outcome for the formation of the postwar trading system? 
At the time of the negotiations, and in subsequent interpretations, critics gave the impression that the Americans were either
imposing upon the British, or 'paying' them for, a multilateral system that first and foremost served American interests.(10)
Even those who have acknowledged the significance of American concessions to the British and others during the ITOnegotiations have focused upon the role of domestic political constraints and strategic considerations; no study has yet
examined role of British resistance to American hegemony. More broadly, hegemonic stability theory has conspicuously failed to
account for the significance of resistance strategies in the formation and durability of stable regimes. 
Thesis and Structure
Historians and political scientists have explained that the US tolerated European demands for discrimination and protection in
order to exert leadership and ensure stability in the postwar world system. Satisfied with this explanation, few have examined
the reasons for or the significance of the British success in Washington in 1945. The implication is that the Americans pursued
two sets of mutually exclusive goals. Firstly, they sought to open the world economy to suit their own expansionist commercial
goals and free trade ideals; simultaneously, they aimed to maintain allied unity and accommodate war-torn economies. The
unremarked complication at the core of this analysis is that the Americans believed they could achieve both of these seemingly
conflicting goals with the same approach - opening the world economy. Freer trade meant economic recovery and international
peace. In light of this interpretation, American concessions in Washington take on greater significance: if the negotiators
believed that their agenda could most effectively generate world peace and prosperity, why did they sacrifice so much of it? 
A close reading of the negotiations in the final months of 1945 presents two answers. Firstly, the British succeeded because
they effectively applied 'soft' diplomacy in the actual negotiations. While most histories of the period examine factors external
to the negotiations, such as strategic and economic interests, there are no accounts of the crucial internal dynamics that led
the Americans to cede ground. Without the traditional tools of 'hard' diplomacy - military, political and economic prestige - the
British negotiators resisted American demands with a combination of lucid arguments (presented to a receptive audience),
pragmatism (versus American idealism), bluff (in the face of American openness), plain stubbornness (aided by American
flexibility), and the shrewd manipulation of the Commonwealth and Dominions to transform an ostensibly bilateral negotiation
into a multilateral forum where Britain and its allies outnumbered the US by a factor of five to one.(11) 
This last factor proved the most significant, and key to the second reason for British success: by pressuring the Americans in
Washington to negotiate the most controversial elements of the organization in a multilateral context, the British ultimately
gained a simple, tactical advantage - numerical superiority. Again, this success required the unwitting aid of the Americans. The
British succeeded by exposing and manipulating a fundamental tension in the American negotiating position that had become
apparent shortly after planning began in 1939. Realizing that they needed a modicum of cooperation to re-invigorate world
trade after the war, the Americans unwittingly elevated their desire for international collaboration to the same level as their
advocacy of free trade principles. The State Department simultaneously advocated a multilateral process and liberal trading
principles. Yet they failed to recognize the tension at the core of this dual program, and thus they never considered the
trade-offs involved in securing both aims. The British, however, were conscious of this conflict. They deliberately pressed the
Americans toward a multilateral forum where British power would be augmented by its ability to form coalitions that challenged
US ideals. 
The three parts of this paper tease out the longer term repercussions of one tense and critical moment at the end of World
War II, before the Cold War set in, and before the Anglo-American alliance settled into a more lasting, postwar posture. Part
two briefly examines four of the key policy provisions secured by the British during the negotiations. Next, part three proffers
an explanation for the British success in 'winning' these policies. Finally, part four examines the particular type of
multilateralism that the British pressed upon the Americans. It posits a hypothesis about the longer term ramifications of the
American compromises in Washington on substance and, more importantly, the durable form of postwar multilateralism.(12) 
Ultimately, the British goal was simply to open American markets and delay the opening of its own. It succeeded. In doing so, it
played a role disproportionate to its material power in forcing the American postwar planners to accept a more moderate,
heterodox, inclusive and flexible trading regime than they would otherwise have supported. They exerted disproportionate
influence upon the origins of the international trading system, which evolved from a truly multilateral political process. The
durability of the GATT is best understood in light of this initial inclusiveness. 
BRITISH VICTORIES IN WASHINGTON
Preferences
Imperial preferences sparked the strongest emotional reactions on both sides of the Atlantic. Secretary of State Cordell Hull,
the father of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, saw free trade as an end in itself. His remarkably zealous support for free
trade stemmed from his conviction, maintained over four decades, that it "dovetailed with peace."(13) Hull concluded from the
depression and the two world wars that economic conflict, brought on by coercion and discrimination in international trade,
exacerbated economic crises and fomented political disputes. Thus for the Hullian free traders,(14) preferences represented
the most dangerous political manifestation of trade barriers -- discrimination. Worse still, they directly harmed US exporters.
In Britain, imperial preferences served as a political symbol of Empire (especially for the Conservatives), to which they clung all
the more passionately as it dissolved around them. Tariff preferences also represented the loyalty of Commonwealth allies,
who had fought alongside the British long before the Americans did. As a result, American ambitions to dismantle a system
that united loyal allies precipitated a stubbornly defensive posture.
The first British tactic was to move the American view of preferences from the unassailable realm of ideology(15) to thenegotiating table. While policies themselves are negotiable - as a means to reach an end - policymakers generally invest more
emotional and moral capital into the ostensibly immutable principles which policies serve. Non-discrimination was a central
principle in the American plan. They had come to view it in grand terms, as " a vital element in the moral armament of the
democratic world."(16) The State Department wanted a British commitment to abolish preferences immediately. The
Americans stressed during the Atlantic Charter and Mutual Aid deliberations that the British should agree as a matter of
principle. In response, the British argued in London, before the formal negotiations even started, "that tariffs and preferences
should be dealt with side by side: any attempt to separate preferences for treatment as a matter of doctrine would raise
grave difficulties."(17) In Washington, they were emphatic. In the first formal meeting of the 'Top Group' of negotiators,
Liesching insisted that preferences would not be yielded but would come "into the general horse trade so that any reductions in
preferences would be handled pari passu with reductions in tariffs." When the Americans resisted, Keynes blurted: "You cannot
make a horse trade if [the] other side knows your horse will fall dead in 3 hours."(18) 
Keynes' comment incisively clarified the British view of preferences. It was purely pragmatic. Without preferences as leverage,
the British had less to exchange for American reductions in tariffs. They wanted to exchange preferences for tariff
reductions. The British would not commit to any specific deadline for the final abolition of preferences, because their abolition
depended upon the receipt of compensating reductions in tariffs. British intransigence stemmed from weakness. Preferences
had become one of their only economic weapons. Rather than turning Keynes' confession to their advantage, the Americans
yielded the point based upon the merits of the British argument. Despite the passionate aversion to preferences in the State
Department, the Americans did not press the British as far as they might have on this point. 
The final language veered far from the simple American proposal:
Members should undertake to take effective and expeditious measures, in accordance with methods to be agreed upon, for the
substantial reduction of tariffs and the elimination of tariff preferences.(19)
The compromise involved more perplexing language:
In the light of the principles set forth in Article VII of the mutual aid agreements, members should enter into arrangements for
the substantial reduction of tariffs and for the elimination of tariff preferences, action for the elimination of preferences
being taken in conjunction with adequate measures for the substantial reduction of barriers to world trade, as part of the
mutually advantageous arrangements contemplated in this document.
Note that the British inserted the qualifying language that the elimination of preferences would be "taken in conjunction with
adequate measures", as "part of the mutually advantageous arrangements" in this document. The precise definition of
"adequate measures" remains unspecified. The British also borrowed a broad reference to "mutually advantageous
arrangements" from Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement in order to press the Americans into accepting their bid to keep
preferences indefinitely -- it is certainly not to their "mutual advantage" to eliminate preferences without concessions on the
American side. The article continues: 
As an initial step in the process of eliminating tariff preferences it should be agreed that:
A. Existing international commitments will not be permitted to stand in the way of action agreed upon with respect to tariff
preferences. 
B. All negotiated reductions in most-favored-nation tariffs will operate automatically to reduce or eliminate margins of
preference.
C. Margins of preference on any product will in no case be increased and no new preferences will be introduced.(20)
Point "A" is an American reference to the British insistence that they cannot eliminate preferences without the consent of the
rest of the Commonwealth. This point is, in effect, moot, because the British delayed the negotiation to reduce preferences
until a later date when Commonwealth countries would be present. Point "C', however, represents an American success. It
guaranteed that preference rates would remain static until they were reduced, with an eye toward eventual elimination. 
Having resolved the preference issue, the British delegation cabled the Cabinet Offices in London on November 6, 1945:
We feel sure that Dominion Governments will share our gratification that, notwithstanding the extreme sensitiveness of U.S.
official opinion on the preference issue, in the final result all our main desiderata have been secured...As regards substance,
the Americans have now abandoned the proposals originally put forward for the immediate sweeping away of all preferences as
morally reprehensible and the position is now established that the reduction or elimination of preferences can only be
considered by agreement between all the parties concerned (i.e. including the party enjoying the preferences) in conjunction
with adequate reductions of tariffs and other trade barriers by the U.S. and other countries. Thus the overriding principle
which we and our negotiators have throughout insisted upon is fully secured..(21) 
The negotiators had reason to feel satisfied with themselves. 
A secret, internal American assessment by the State Department proved less accurate: The section on tariff preferences finally agreed upon was a substantial victory for the American delegation... In lieu of the
straightforward provision of the original United States draft...the final language agreed upon still provided for the elimination of
tariff preferences, but went out of its way to sugar-coat the pill.(22) 
This analysis neglected to mention that no specific deadline was set for the abolition of preferences. The "sugar-coating"
actually altered the terms so that instead of a free and immediate termination, preference reductions would be purchased with
American tariff reductions. The State Department report blatantly misrepresented a major American concession as a
"substantial victory".(23) 
Quotas / Quantitative Restrictions
On three other key issues, the report provided a more accurate account:
Other matters on which there was initial disagreement as to substance or method, viz. quantitative restrictions, state trading,
and cartels, were worked out during the Washington negotiations by amending the draft American proposals along the general
lines of suggestions submitted by the British delegation.(24)
Again, the Americans objected to quantitative restrictions, or quotas, because of their discriminatory nature. Due to their
ideological resistance to discrimination even in the transition phase, this issue became the second most contentious during the
negotiations. Liesching reported to the Cabinet on November 3 that for four successive meetings he had debated the point with
Hawkins. He used "every available argument". Still, he found Hawkins "most obstinate and doctrinaire". Hawkins stressed that he
had definite instructions from Clayton. Finally, Liesching threatened him. Hawkins' insistence "might wreck the prospects for
reaching any agreement upon commercial policy as a whole". 
It was not until after the most strenuous and prolonged discussions with Hawkins and some of his colleagues on three separate
days and after the exchange of numerous drafts and counter-drafts that, upon Wilcox being brought in, we finally drew from
the Americans reluctant acceptance of the provisions relating to balance of payments restrictions which form paragraphs 2 to
6 of the text in my immediately following telegram.(25)
The Americans conceded the point again. For balance of payments purposes in the transition period, quotas would be permitted
to countries "confronted with" an unfavorable balance of payments. In addition, the British quietly ensured that the language of
the quota provision was sufficiently vague to allow not only for "curative", but also for "preventive" measures.(26) 
Cartels
The settlement on cartels was more explicit, and also more surprising. Cartels had played a particularly poignant role in
American history. President Roosevelt and Cordell Hull had come of age in a period often referred to as the 'Progressive Era'.
Progressive reformers attacked many traditional, American political and economic practices. Business monopolies, or cartels,
figured prominently among the reform targets. In fact Roosevelt's cousin, President Theodore Roosevelt, had been in the
vanguard of the self-styled, cowboy 'trust-busters' around the turn of the century. By the time of the Washington
negotiations, the US had developed a good deal of anti-trust case law. Roosevelt himself, who usually remained relatively aloof
from the retails of the postwar planning process, sent an impassioned memo to Hull in September of 1944.(27) As an issue
that was guaranteed to resonate in Congress, the Americans placed a strong emphasis on delineating strict rules to curtail
restrictive business practices. 
The British, however, viewed cartels more in terms of their contribution to stability than in light of their threat to competition.
They had little experience in the details of fighting monopolies, and almost no case law on the subject. They thus had trouble
imagining how the ITO could, in practical terms, combat international cartels. To counter the rigid American proposals, they
insisted that the ITO be empowered to examine the issue on a case-by-case basis. The British themselves were shocked by the
rapid success of their proposed amendment: 
We have had further extensive discussions with the Americans on the Cartel question and they have shown a most welcome
disposition to accept our mode of approach--Certainly it is not an outcome which we should have ventured to predict after the
first rather stormy meeting on this subject.(28) 
The British negotiators realized that they had received a good deal more rapidly than they had thought possible. In London the
Cabinet decided that it had come upon a good opportunity. It cabled instructions for the negotiations to further alter the
negotiated text so that the countries themselves, instead of the ITO, would be able to make enquiries and report on suspected
"restrictive agreements". Liesching responded:
We are reluctant to propose revision of wording which might well revive suspicion of our good intentions, especially since we
understand that American negotiators, in putting the draft forward, are taking a definite risk that it may appear to Congress
to concede too much.(29) 
The British negotiators in Washington were so surprised by their sudden success that they refused a Cabinet request to pushthe Americans further. The grounds they provided for refusing are even more astonishing: they had apparently begun to worry
that their blatant success might damage the ITO's prospects for passage through the American Congress.
State Trading
On October 12, the same day that the Americans agreed to the British cartel proposal, they conceded to the British requests
on state trading. State trading was another issue of crucial importance to American ideologues.(30) But the British delegation
happily cabled home: "On this subject too the Americans have accepted completely our point of view."(31) As had become by
then a pattern, the Americans at first resisted passionately, sometimes even incoherently; on October 9, the British reported
that, "as so often happens, when state trading is under discussion, the Americans seem to be inspired more by perplexity than
by any positive attitude one way or the other."(32) The final compromise allowed for state trading as long as complete
monopolies pledged to buy and sell on a commercial basis. Again, the vague provision which the British pursued allowed plenty of
room for interpretation in practice.(33)
Critics will observe that the Americans survived the Washington negotiations with their over-arching goal intact: the world's
two most powerful trading nations agreed to a joint proposal for an international organization that would liberalize and
normalize trade relations. Even though each provision contained major exceptions, the Americans could still anticipate the
eventual elimination of trade preferences and quotas, the curtailment of restrictive business practices, and the clarification of
relations with state traders. Compromise could be viewed as the price for lead authorship. In any case, the Americans had not
yet committed to these concessions. 
None of the British modifications, however, would be reversed. They would be extended, and creep into new areas of the
Washington Proposals . The tentative nature of the negotiated agreements served British interests more than it did the
Americans'; as will be shown, the British pressed for a non-committal approach to the negotiations, and all along planned to
extract further concessions at a later date. These later concessions ultimately robbed the Americans of lead authorship - for
the planned ITO never materialized. 
TABLE 1
American Compromises on Economic Principle - 4 Key Issues
  September, 1945 December, 1945
  Pre-negotiation positions: Compromises in the  Washington Proposals:
Preferences US: The Americans demanded the abolition of Imperial
preferences. 
VS. 
UK: The British intended to keep Imperial preferences.
UK position accepted: No demand for an immediate
elimination of preferences; Americans also accepted
the British charge that reduction in preference
margins required considerable US tariff concessions. 
Quotas  US: The Americans wanted to eliminate quantitative
restrictions. 
VS. 
UK: The British supported quotas to help with balance
of payments difficulties. 
UK position accepted: Exceptions for balance of
payments reasons, as the British had demanded.
Cartels  US: The Americans adamantly opposed cartels in
principle, because of their damaging effects on
competition. 
VS. 
UK: The British felt that cartels should not be
prohibited, as they provide stability in prices &
business conditions. 
UK position accepted: Rather than providing strict
rules curtailing the practices of cartels, as the State
Department had proposed, the planned international
trade organization would investigate any purportedly
malignant trusts on a case-by-case basis.
State Trading US: The Americans aimed to outlaw state trading. 
VS. 
UK: The British supported non-discriminatory state
traders. 
UK position accepted: Americans agreed to permit
state trading as long as complete monopolies pledged
to buy and sell on a commercial basis. 
HARD WEAKNESS, SOFT STRENGTH: THE BRITISH BLUFF
How did the British persuade the Americans to accept their policies? Diplomacy played a significant factor. One particular
diplomatic tactic, entailing bluff and delay, may have proved decisive. But the British were helped in no small measure by a
series of American miscalculations, and more generally by American sympathy and largesse. The US negotiators manifested a
rare willingness to tolerate the British perspective and tactics. 
The Americans
The British did not anticipate the American attitude. In his description of the pre-negotiation atmosphere, historian Robert M.Hathaway observed: "Just how much the Americans would be willing to cooperate with their British cousins remained to be seen.
The answer, moreover, rested as much on emotion and irrationality as on any cold-blooded calculation of the national
interest."(34)
American calculations could not fairly be described as cold-blooded. In fact, they adopted very few explicit pre-negotiation
strategies. Will Clayton delivered the draft proposals to the Foreign Office in August and the State Department then adopted a
wait-and-see attitude until the British arrived in Washington. This approach stemmed partly from understandable surprise at
the end of the war and the sudden on-set of the negotiations.
Nonetheless, a series of American miscalculations carried over from the wartime planning process. Most fundamentally, the
Americans overestimated the appeal of their free trade agenda. As conceived by Hull's State Department, the postwar trade
program had by 1945 come to serve so many otherwise irreconcilable policy goals - ranging from national economic and
security interests to world peace - that its inherent appeal was no longer questioned. It came as a shock when the British
attacked free trade on its merits. 
Although the Americans were not only oblivious to general resistance to their approach, they specifically misread the British. It
was widely recognized in the State Department that the British Empire had historically depended upon trade.(35) They thus
viewed the Ottawa Agreements of 1932, which established the Imperial preference system, as a temporary aberration devised
in response to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff hike of 1930. Even after several years of discussions in which the British resisted
American efforts to commit them to liberal postwar policies, the Americans viewed British hesitancy as a temporary bargaining
tactic. Until Keynes arrived in September of 1945 with hard economic data demonstrating Britain's unprecedented financial
crisis, most of the postwar planners assumed that an American tariff reduction would be enough to induce the British to
accept a multilateral trading system on US terms.
They also overestimated the impact of their own potential tariff reduction. They were empowered by Congress to reduce
tariffs to fifty percent below 1939 levels,(36) which proved insufficient to satisfy the British negotiators. The British claimed
that their economy needed more help in the transition from war to peacetime production. Will Clayton recognized the British
dilemma, but presumed that the loan would satisfy their last legitimate basis for opposition to a multilateral regime--the
transitional period. But the State Department over-estimated the loan's potential to persuade Britain to risk abandoning
protection. "If the [loan] agreement is ratified," Clayton testified to the House of Representatives, "we will have multilateral
trade."(37)
The US negotiators also had a propensity for seeking formal and specific policy commitments. This led, historian Richard
Gardner has argued, to an appearance of consensus, but did not contribute toward reconciling fundamental differences. In fact
this very attempt to draft detailed statements of principles could lead to hardening of positions and diminished the prospects
for long-term settlement.(38) Again, the US planners presumed that other nations, especially Britain, adhered to the State
Department perspective on free trade. Only weakness, ignorance, or aggression led to discriminatory and protectionist policies.
The final significant American miscalculation involved the negotiators' propensity for arbitrarily singling out certain types of
protection as more damaging than other types. This tendency puzzled the British. One example particular illustrates the point: 
The Americans mustered all their resources in an attempt to demonstrate the particular iniquity of export taxes. In the end
Clayton summed up by saying that he thought that he agreed with much that had been said on both sides and suggested that a
further attempt should be made to reach agreement at the expert level. We are not sure that in fact agreement will be
possible; for the Americans have committed themselves very strongly about this particular variety of sin. But in any case we
intend to make no concession. At the worst the position will remain open.(39)
This excerpt also illustrates other important characteristics of the American approach to these negotiations. Export taxes
was another "particular variety of sin" robustly attacked by the Americans, before they completely withdrew their protest to
the British point of view.(40) As in this instance, they showed a notable tendency to bluster and then retreat. After an
impassioned attack, they sometimes surrendered their position without waiting to wrest a better offer from the British.(41)
This extract also demonstrates a conspicuous flexibility on the part of the Americans; Clayton stated "that he thought that he
agreed with much that had been said on both sides". Their commitment to the success of the negotiations led Clayton and his
colleagues not only to be receptive in practice -- by sincerely remaining open to persuasion by British arguments(42) - but to
ensure that they appeared  receptive to the British. While the Americans consistently voiced appreciation after the British
finished putting forward their arguments, the UK negotiators rarely, if ever, returned the favor.(43)
The British
These differing approaches may have been influenced by the fact that while the Americans arrived ideologically committed to a
cooperative and open trading system, the British had come to ensure their own economic survival. The Americans, it has been
argued, could "afford" to sacrifice immediate economic advantage for the sake of their ideology, and to ensure the operation of
a stable system. Such was the hegemon's duty. And, as one historian has argued, the hegemon's "dilemma" -- "trying to
maintain a congenial international system can sap the national power it is supposed to protect."(44) 
Yet the British, with an economy more dependent on foreign trade, had an even greater stake in the restoration of world trade.Their top economists, however, led by Keynes and James Meade, were less convinced than Hullian free traders that liberalism
served as a panacea for economic and political maladies. Although both Hull and Keynes hoped to encourage a dramatic increase
in trade volume after the war, Keynes expressed a strong distaste for Hull's strategic emphasis on border issues such as
tariff levels. He believed that the quantity of trade was ultimately determined by its relationship to the quantity of domestic
employment and economic activity; Hull believed that the height of trade barriers determined the quantity of trade. Whereas
Hull placed his faith in market capitalism, Keynes expressed skepticism about the price mechanism upon which free trade
ultimately relied: he doubted "that increased exports sufficient to pay for those imports which had previously been offset by
earnings on foreign investments would be 'automatically generated by the price system.'"(45) Most significantly for the
Washington negotiations, Keynes, Meade and British policymakers shared a conception of full employment that allowed for the
strategic use of protection. Freed from the constricting bonds of doctrinaire opposition to discrimination in trade, UK
negotiators challenged American ideology with British pragmatism.
The British successfully synthesized two conflicting strands in their negotiating position. They combined a plaintive plea for
mercy on grounds of war devastation, with an unyielding demanded for equal respect at the conference table. While most of the
American postwar planners were unreconstructed Wilsonian idealists, many of the British negotiators such as Lord Halifax,
Liesching, and even Keynes descended from a diplomatic tradition based upon maintaining the balance of power in Europe and
protecting the British Empire. In 1933 the Empire reached its apogee. It covered one quarter of the earth's land surface and
comprised one quarter of its population. As David Reynolds has argued, however, "its resource-base lay across the seas in
far-flung colonies which lacked a natural unity." Its base was tenuous and its collapse imminent. The British Empire had long
relied upon the appearance rather than the substance of power. To compete with rivals the British often used their 'prestige',
and the 'intangibles' of Empire. "The image of power was often as important as the reality - more exactly, image was a part of
the reality, prestige was a form of power." "Bluff" tactics proved intrinsic to the maintenance of power.(46) 
Rarely had Britain's ruse served them better than in the Washington negotiations and the multilateral conferences that
followed them. They could not rely on hard diplomacy to support their stance, and yet every time the Americans protested a
particular stance, the British merely held firm and obstinately refused to budge. Of course, they Americans helped by relenting,
often when the British were nearly ready to capitulate. Nonetheless, simple British diplomatic resistance played an important
role.
The Negotiations
Two tactical approaches served the British diplomats well when the two sides came together. The first involved the
manipulation of interested parties external to the negotiation, and the second required the exploitation of a tension in the
American conception of postwar multilateralism.
The first tactic was to neutralize the use by Americans of their favorite 'bad cop' - Congress. In an early conflict stemming
from the American group's anxieties about Congressional approval of the Proposals , Keynes persuaded Clayton that both
sides faced equal domestic political constraints. Therefore, he demanded, these constraints should not unduly favor the
positions of either the Americans or British. Clayton concurred.(47) Unfortunately for the Americans, the comparative political
constraints were by no means equal. Whereas the American negotiators needed to persuade a Congress dominated by
Republicans hostile to both the State Department trade agenda and to the Truman administration, the British Labor Cabinet
faced less daunting opposition in Parliament, where they commanded a significant majority (without which it would not be in
office in the first place). Soon after this exchange took place between Keynes and Clayton, all of the participants adopted a
remarkable attitude toward Congress: it was viewed as a common enemy. Both sides collaborated in an effort alternately to
deceive and appease critics in the American legislature.
When the two groups were debating the possibility that one Dominion might hold the US and the rest of the Commonwealth to
ransom, the Americans worried more about objections that might be raised in Congress to this potential problem, than about
the substance of the problem itself - the very real possibility that a small trading nation might use its position in the
Commonwealth, and its close relation to Britain, to force concessions out of the US.(48) As would become a pattern, the
Americans expended more energy at the negotiating table considering how to outwit Congress than their opposition. Based upon
their actions during the negotiation, they appear to have viewed their own legislature as a greater threat to their plans than
they did the British. While they may have been correct, in that the British views on trade were closer to their own than some of
their critics in the American government, this tactic led to an ironic result: by focusing on persuading Congress to accept the
compromises, instead of resisting the compromises themselves, they ceded more ground to the British than they might
otherwise have done. As a result, the increasingly protectionist Proposals  began to alienate the State Department's best
weapon against Congressional opposition -- their free trade allies in the US. 
Part of the challenge facing the Americans stemmed from their commitment to success. They had invested so much time and
energy into their postwar planning process, that they refused to contemplate the best alternative to a negotiated agreement
with the British. Failure was not an option. While the British made several threats to walk out of the negotiations, the
Americans did not threaten such bold action once. This attitude may have accounted for their inability to hold out long enough
for the British to offer counter-concessions. It also explains the American commitment to the hope of agreement, even at the
unreciprocated sacrifice of their own positions. The US negotiators invested themselves more in the negotiation process itself,
while the Brits stayed close to their positions. 
One of the most important British negotiating positions, paradoxically, stemmed from a major investment in the process. Tosecure their own policies, the British gambled on American support for an open, multilateral negotiating procedure in which they
could draw strength from the Commonwealth and other countries opposed to American positions. Thus while the Americans had
over-committed themselves to immediate progress and commitment in Washington, the British favored tentative agreement,
and sought to delay commitment until they could bring in reinforcements.
PRESSING FOR PROCEDURAL MULTILATERALISM
To understand the longer-term consequences of the British pressure for a multilateral negotiating process, it is important
briefly to consider the evolution of the term 'multilateralism'. Since the Second World War, definitions of multilateralism have
developed in relation to the trading system.(49)
While, as will be shown, the definition evolved during the planning and negotiation process that led to the GATT, the General
Agreement has come so significantly to embody multilateralism, that it is difficult to define the idea without referring to trade.
This habit makes it hard to understand the concept itself. Moreover, as we have come to view multilateralism largely through
the operation of the GATT, it is difficult to determine how the concept initially arose and developed. Examination of the planning
and a negotiating process indicates that the concept itself was intended to have far wider implications for its adherents. 
Definitions and Precedents
While the term has been broadly applied for more than fifty years, few authors have attempted to clarify its precise meaning --
even through study of the GATT's origins. In 1956, Gardner defined multilateralism purely in terms of trade and payments:
For the purpose of this history we may define such a system as one in which barriers to trade and payments are reduced to
moderate levels and made non-discriminatory in their application. This objective is obviously not the same as free trade. ...
Multilateralism does not mean the elimination, but only the reduction, of tariffs and other trade barriers. Any trade barriers
remaining after this reduction, however, must be non-discriminatory in their application.(50) 
Gardner's definition actually incorporated the purposes of the GATT spelled out in the Agreement's own preamble: "to
contribute to rising standards of living and full employment by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of
discriminatory treatment in international commerce." The American negotiators, however, had greater ambitions than this
preamble in the end reflected. An understanding of both the origins and functioning of the GATT requires a more nuanced
definition than Gardner has provided.
In the late 1980's and early 1990's, several authors began engaging one another in an effort to define multilateralism. For
Robert Keohane, multilateralism simply meant "The practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more
states."(51) William Diebold, Jr. differentiated between "formal" and "substantive" multilateralism. For Diebold this difference is
illustrated in the difference between the bilateral agreements of Cordell Hull and those of Hjalmar Schacht.(52) John Gerald
Ruggie then interpreted Diebold's definition to mean that "the issue is not the number of parties as such [formal], as the kinds
of relations  [substantive] that are instituted among them." Ruggie in turn advocated a definition building on this distinction;
where Diebold described formal and substantive multilateralism, Ruggie referred to "nominal" (Keohane's definition) versus
"qualitative" (involving a principle) multilateralism.(53) 
With Keohane's definition as a starting point, Ruggie's focus on qualitative or principled multilateralism under-emphasizes the
importance of multilateral coordination,  which is the most vital part of the meaning. When the aim is to understand the origins
and durability of multilateral institutions, study should focus on how cooperation is established and maintained. In other words,
what incentive does each participant have to relinquish a degree of sovereignty for the sake of multilateral policy coordination?
To provide a helpful conceptual framework in which to understand the origins of the GATT, this study proposes and considers
four general types of coordination that generate a multilateral result. A multilateral institution may establish and sustain itself
with just one, or with a combination of these incentives. The definitions of multilateralism discussed below are crucial because,
firstly, they stem from a close reading of the actual process that led to the advent of postwar multilateralism;(54) and,
secondly, they highlight the significance of particular agents' decisions in the planning and negotiating process.
Procedural  multilateralism results from what the British refer to as a 'talking shop': the direct involvement by three or more
participants in the actual negotiation and design of the shared policy. Countries may participate in a multilateral institution
whose principles they do not support because, through their involvement in the negotiation process, they offer concessions on
principle in return for payment in another form. Historians have argued about whether, for instance, the Americans intended
Lend-Lease and the postwar loan to Britain as a form of payment for British support of the principle of non-discrimination.
While this paper takes challenges that contention, the argument maintains that the British received Lend-Lease, a postwar
loan, and an exclusive seat at the negotiating table in return for their acceptance of the principle of non-discrimination and
freer trade. 
Principled  multilateralism evolves when there is sufficient consensus on principles or policies such that all parties are
prepared to coordinate their actions, whether or not they took part in negotiating the characteristics of the joint policy. In
other words, whether or not they sat at the table to design the multilateral agreement or institution, nations will cooperatebecause they agree with the principles upon which the cooperation is based. 
Instrumental  multilateralism arises when parties decide to coordinate their behavior with other countries without having taken
part in the negotiation of the action, and without necessarily believing in the merits of the principle upon which the coordination
is based; they view multilateralism as an instrument to gain an ancillary benefit. A nation that did not help to design the GATT,
and does not believe open trade will help its economy, may nonetheless join the institution in order to bolster its political
relations with other participants and to receive the benefits of lower barriers to other markets (all the while it may stubbornly
resist the measures to reduce its own barriers, by delaying their implementation and applying for exemptions).
Coercive  multilateralism results when a party coordinates its policy with one or more powerful nations because these nations
force it do so, through economic, political or military means. Nazi Germany aggressively manipulated its trading partners and
thereby provides the best example of coercive multilateralism.
The American postwar planners focused on obtaining two types of multilateralism. As Gardner has argued, from the outset of
the Second World War the State Department determined that "post-war planning should be carried on in advance; that the
United States should base its foreign policy on membership in a world organization; and that achievement of peace would
require the adoption of appropriate policies in the economic field."(55) In other words, the Americans intended to institute
principled  multilateralism in the postwar trading system, and advocated procedural  multilateralism to establish it.
Procedural Multilateralism as a Counter-Intuitive Decision
The major external models upon which the Americans could alternatively have considered basing their proposed system involved
asymmetrical systems of either principled or coercive multilateralism. The most comparatively benevolent option derived from
the British, nineteenth century system. In this system, Britain served as the pivotal nation in a series of bilateral trade
agreements, many of which they applied more broadly through application of the most favored nation principle. The Soviets
presented a far more manipulative model to the Americans, where Moscow dictated trade relations among its satellites based
on a planned, centralized, hierarchical system of state-trading. Many Americans considered another major model, the Nazi
bilateral system, the very worst example of discrimination and coercion. Under Hjalmar Schacht, the Nazi official who designed
and implemented the system, the Germans often deliberately imported more than they exported, and then they required that
their trading partners "liquidate their claims on Germany through reinvestment there or by purchasing deliberately over-priced
German goods. Thus, its trading partners were doubly dependent on Germany." In addition, the Germans additionally manipulated
their partners, generally smaller and weaker states in East or Central Europe, the Balkans, and Latin America, through
monetary clearing arrangements.(56)
Having seen fifty years of the GATT and experienced the strengthening of support for open trade, it is very difficult for us to
understand the degree to which the planners' advocacy of multilateralism challenged conventional practice. Furthermore, in
terms of American commercial interests, pursuing international coordination seems like a counter-intuitive decision. The US
had far more unilateral and bilateral options available to it than any other country in the world; it passed up the opportunity to
establish a system that would more directly leverage its power advantage. Given its support for principled multilateralism and
the stability that non-discrimination promised, support for procedural multilateralism ran directly counter to apparent
American interests. A bilateral / MFN system would have accounted for the American desire for non-discrimination and better
suited American economic and business aims: bilateralism was more specific, addressed concrete issues on a case-by-case
basis, and would have enabled the more effective application of US power over weaker, individual trading partners. 
In fact the Americans could simply have continued the trade pattern that they had already established after the inception of
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) in 1934, where they negotiated a series of bilateral agreements and extended
them broadly through application of the most-favored nation principle. In the thirty-two bilateral agreements that the US
completed between 1934 and 1945, the Americans utilized their economic and political predominance to their advantage. Why
risk diluting that power in a multilateral forum, at a time when its dominance was greater than it had ever been? Douglas Irwin
has asked the counterfactual question, "how would trade policies have evolved in the absence of the GATT?" 
Had there been no GATT, the postwar system would not necessarily have reverted to the interwar chaos. Because the United
States had initiated a program of bilateral trade liberalization (largely with Latin American countries) after the passage of the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, the United States might have become the central node of a series of bilateral trade
agreements, although not necessarily with unconditional MFN as the ruling principle.(57)
It is very likely indeed that the Americans could have successfully continued the operation of the RTAA and begun to
re-establish stable trading relations.
In addition to its lack of external models, the US decision to advocate procedural multilateralism in international commercial
negotiations was without precedent in the history of American trade relations. The US shunned or obstructed the majority of
interwar, international economic conferences; as recently as 1930 the US had adopted the highest non-negotiable tariffs in its
history. Yet the US appears to have voluntarily led the way in creating an institution whose mode of operation diminished its
sovereign right to raise tariff levels and, additionally, seemed to undermine US hegemony.
What seems stranger still, why did it invite twenty-four other countries to, as Churchill put it, "jaw-jaw" rather than
"war-war"(58) in the design  of the procedures and principles of the American, proposed multilateralism? US planners couldsimply have invited foreign nations to join them in a multilateral forum that they had already constructed, based on principles
and procedures that the Americans alone had devised. (The inclusive lure of procedural multilateralism in the system's
operation, in addition to American political and economic pressure, might have attracted wide participation despite the fact
that the system was unilaterally imposed by the US.) Instead, while the Americans did put forward a pre-drafted blueprint of a
'Charter' for world trade, they constantly involved the British in the planning process during the war. In effect the Americans
advocated a talking shop to get a talking shop -- procedural multilateralism not only in the operation but also in the design of
the postwar, multilateral trading system. 
The British Strategy -- Press for Procedural Multilateralism
Why did the Americans adopt this approach? Again, pressure from the British played a significant role. From early in the war,
and at the highest levels, the British deliberately pursued a strategy in which they attempted to delay and outnumber the
Americans. 
When first confronted in 1941 with American pressure to commit to non-discrimination after the war, Churchill adopted a
strategy that would similarly characterize his later resistance to allied demands to open a second front between 1942 and
1944 - give the appearance of agreement, while desperately stalling. This was a tactic Churchill apparently learned from
watching the way his own staff handled him.(59) Churchill and British officials then applied this approach to the Atlantic
Charter and Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement, in which they pressed for vague and general agreements - where Britain
would dismantle preferences in what they termed "mutually advantageous" conditions, without specifying any further what this
term might entail - that committed them to continue discussing the issues, but little else. 
In his memo to the Cabinet on August 16, 1945, Cripps made clear the reason that the British did not want to be pressured into
accepting American trade principles during the war: "We and the Dominions should not be dealt with one at a time and squeezed
on preference reductions."(60) Later, the Ambassador to the United States at the time of the Washington negotiations, Lord
Halifax, made more explicit the strategy he and the other negotiators planned to adopt. In a telegram to Hugh Dalton, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Cripps, the President of the Board of Trade, he explained:
I anticipate this talk will be pretty general. Clayton may perhaps be preparing to hand to us a revised paper showing any
changes made by the U.S. side since the London talks. If so, we should propose to go through it with him in an endeavor to
establish broadly agreed points and points which we know are unacceptable. We should hope in this way to avoid delay and to
postpone as long as possible consideration of the sticking points,  thus facilitating fincancial talks and possibly leaving over to
the Conference in the Spring points on which we should hope to bring the U.S.A. up against opinions of other countries. (61)
[emphasis added]
Halifax emphasized here the intention to postpone the "sticking points" until they could bring the American negotiators "up
against opinions of other countries." The British clearly knew precisely how they would benefit from procedural
multilateralism.(62)
Applying the Strategy
On October 1, during the first meeting of the 'Top Group' of negotiators in Washington, the British applied their strategy.
Liesching made a point of expressing his support for the American document outlining the "procedure for implementing
multilateral arrangements" because it "makes it clear that the proposed arrangements would not be forced on outsiders
without their having an opportunity to participate in the formulation of the arrangements."(63) The inclusion of "outsiders" was
buttressed by delays to get them involved. Here is how they conceived of the preference settlement:
The requirement [stipulated in Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement] may be met equally logically by reduction [note: instead
of elimination, as the Americans proposed] of preferences now against reduction of tariffs, coupled with an understanding that
at a future date...a further conference at which in return for further reductions of tariffs there would be further reductions
of preferences and so on into the future, until at some indefinite date the final stage was reached with preferences eliminated
but tariffs, although greatly reduced, still perhaps above zero.(64)
The imprecise focus in this explanation to the Americans - "further" conference and "future" and "indefinite" dates - typifies
the British approach to commitments on controversial issues. By November, the British had begun t congratulate themselves:
We feel sure that Dominion Governments will share our gratification that, notwithstanding the extreme sensitiveness of U.S.
official opinion on the preference issue, in the final result all our main desiderata have been secured. No cards have been
thrown away in advance of the detailed negotiations in which all members of the Commonwealth will participate, and not only has
nothing been agreed which would in any way prejudice the basis on which each one of us would enter the March conference
[which in the end was held in London from Oct - Nov, 1946] , but the formula ensures that there can be no reduction or
elimination of preferences without adequate compensation for those affected.(65)
Here again the British characterized as a victory the fact that "nothing has been agreed which would in any way prejudice the
basis on which each one of us would enter the March conference."Soon after, the Americans began to resist the attempt to bring the Commonwealth directly into their bilateral negotiations with
the British. On November 9, Clayton grew angry:
1.The core of the new difficulty that has arisen is this. It appears that Clayton has taken violent exception to the last part of
paragraph 3 of our explanation, saying that the acknowledgment of the dependence of modifications on the "consent" of third
parties is in effect a repudiation of 2(a) of the formula.
2. We have protested at great length to his officials that this rests on a misconception of the process envisaged and that the
idea of consent is integral at once to the conception of a bargain and to the way we run affairs in the Commonwealth and
Robbins, who has now returned, was able to impress upon them the insurmountable difficulties which would be created in London
if they persisted in their attitude.(66)
It became apparent that the British had begun attempting to transform their bargaining in Washington into a multilateral
negotiation to serve their own interests, even before the conferences in London and Geneva that followed the bilateral
exchanges in Washington. The "third party" referred to above does not refer to any American allies or 'dominions', such as Cuba
or the Phillipines, but rather to the Commonwealth. The British had managed a subtle but crucial victory by demanding
Commonwealth "consent" before they made any commitments. Thus they effectively "neutralized" the American external,
interested party - Congress - while they used their own external party to full advantage.
Of course, they sought more than just immediate Commonwealth support in Washington. In a later telegram, they explained the
importance of making the American commitment to Commonwealth "consent" explicit:
We would call your attention to the fact that we have included in paragraph 2 of the draft in Nabob 351 the words "in the light
of the views expressed by other countries" taken from 5 (A) of Baboon 279, which would leave it open to us to support any
valid points put forward by the Dominions or other countries at the Spring conference. It is important to get this phrase on
record.(67) 
With the phrase "on record", the US would soon contend with the opinions of many other countries at the conferences which
followed the Washington negotiations.
CONCLUSION - CONSEQUENCES
A central, working hypothesis of this research program is that a key American miscalculation in the planning process made a
disproportionate impact on the GATT's origins and evolution. The most significant mistake that the US made was to presume
that it could impose its own brand of neo-classically inspired free trade via a multilateral negotiating procedure. Partly because
the GATT developed as a truly multilateral institution, and the US postwar planners overestimated their ability to further US
aims in that context, the American free trade agenda was thwarted. 
The British played a significant role in this process, not only by diluting the American free trade agenda during the bilateral
negotiations in Washington, but by pressing for procedural multilateralism in the design of the trading system. The British
recognized the ambiguity of the American position; they supported and enhanced the cooperative element of the State
Department approach as an aid in undermining the economic agenda of the free trade idealists.
Historians who have examined the origins of the GATT have completely overlooked the untenable stance that the Americans
adopted. While analysts have focused upon the State Department demand for free trade, their arguments have underestimated
the significance of the negotiating process  that the Americans simultaneously demanded. The most significant direct
consequence of the Washington negotiations was the demise of the ITO. Paradoxically, American misjudgments and
concessions, during the very multilateral negotiation process that the US advocated, contributed to the GATT's survival. The
more rigid and structured ITO did not survive the American compromises - as Diebold has argued, it lost the domestic support
of its free trade constituency as a result of the loopholes and exceptions that it permitted.(68)
In its wake, the provisional, flexible GATT survived and expanded.
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